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The crisis of  the 1980s has brought into stark relief the economic and political 
limitations of  populist policy cycles, in which governments seek to spur eco- 
nomic growth by the expansion of domestic demand and the redistribution of 
income. Such approaches have been recurrent features of Latin American po- 
litical economies since the 1930s. Although moderate versions have arguably 
played  a positive role in fostering  industrialization,  they  sooner or later run 
into serious external bottlenecks.  In their more radical incarnations-those, 
for example, associated with Peron, Allende, and Alan Garcia-they  have led 
to major (and predictable) economic and political collapse. These are charac- 
terized  by  very  high  levels  of  inflation,  stagnation  of  growth  and exports, 
capital flight, and political polarization. 
There are four questions that need to be asked about populist policy cycles 
in Latin America. (1) Why have they been so prevalent in Latin America,  as 
opposed to other parts of the world? (2) What accounts for variations in the 
intensity and frequency of  populist policy cycles within Latin America? (3) 
What accounts for persistence in these policy cycles over time, notwithstand- 
ing predictable  limitations? Under what conditions  is there a “learning pro- 
cess” that can lead to positive modifications in such approaches or  to the adop- 
tion of others? (4) What are the prospects for the future? Have populist cycles 
ended and, if so, why? 
2.1  Definitions: The Economic and Political Context of Populism 
Before beginning to address these questions, we need to make clear what 
we  mean  by  populism. Our definition  is more  specific  than most others; it 
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involves  a  set  of  economic policies designed to  achieve  specific political 
goals. Those political goals are (1) mobilizing support within organized labor 
and  lower-middle-class groups; (2) obtaining complementary backing from 
domestically oriented business; and (3) politically isolating the rural oligar- 
chy,  foreign enterprises, and large-scale domestic industrial elites. The eco- 
nomic policies to attain these goals include, but are not limited to: (1) budget 
deficits to stimulate domestic demand; (2) nominal wage increases plus price 
controls to effect income redistribution; and (3) exchange-rate control or ap- 
preciation to cut inflation and to raise wages and profits in nontraded-goods 
sectors. 
To  further specify our definition, a few additional comments may be help- 
ful. First,  we  are referring to the political and economic characteristics of 
governments, not just to isolated policies or to the movements or parties asso- 
ciated with political leaders.  I  Second, the political characteristics of the alli- 
ances described eliminates “right-wing populism,” whether of the Reagan or 
Latin American military variety.* The definition also excludes from consider- 
ation certain  historical populist experiences with  a rural focus.  In  fact,  it 
should be emphasized that  we are referring specifically to Latin American 
versions of  populism in  the twentieth century. Third, we are including here 
both  “classical” and “new” populism, to use the distinction put forward by 
Cardoso and Helwege (in this volume). We are not saying that the set of mac- 
roeconomic policies discussed are the only policies followed, nor are we spec- 
ifying the ultimate goals of the 
Using our definition, it is possible to rank and compare various experiences 
of Latin American populism. One attempt to do so is shown in table 2.1. The 
cases included are Salvador Allende (Chile,  1970-73),  Juan Peron (Argen- 
tina,  1973-76),  Alh  Garcia (Peru,  1985-90),  JosC  Sarney (Brazil,  1985- 
90), Luis Echeverria (Mexico,  1970-76),  and Carlos Andrks Perez (Vene- 
zuela,  1974-78).  The table suggests that  Allende, Per&,  and Garcia rank 
high on both the political and economic components of populism. Echeverria 
and Perez represent less intense populist episodes. Sarney is in-between; his 
economic policies are more like the first group, but his political alliance was 
more similar to that of Echevem’a and PCrez. 
In  the Allende,  Peron,  and Garcia periods, labor and  other low-income 
1.  This distinction was introduced by Paul Drake of the University of  California,  San Diego, 
one of the commentators on an earlier version of this paper at the conference held at the Inter- 
American Development Bank, Washington, D.C., May 18-19,  1990. 
2. The notion of right-wing populism is suggested in Williamson (1990, p. 3). 
3. Cardoso and Helwege (in this volume) also draw a distinction between populism and “so- 
cialism,” claiming that Allende’s Chile and Sandinista Nicaragua should not be considered popu- 
list. While we agree with them about Nicaragua (although because of its policies and the war, 
rather than the supposed socialist character of the government), we strongly disagree about Chile. 
Regardless of the ultimate goals of  the Allende government, even its own participants did not 
claim the government was socialist but “preparing for a transition to socialism.” More important, 
as a way of increasing political support, a multiclass coalition was sought and distinctly populist 
policies were followed. Table 2.1  Latin American Governments Ranked according to Populist Tendencies 
~~ 
Political Goals  Economic Policies 
Anti-oligarchy,  Wage Increase/  Overvalued 
Government  Labor Base  Business Alliance  Foreign Capital  Budget Deficits  Price Controls  Exchange Rate 
Allende (1970-73)  ++  +  ++  ++  ++  ++ 
Perh  (197S76)  ++  +  +  ++  ++  ++ 
Garcia (1985-90)  ++  +  ++  +  ++  ++ 
Samey (1985-90)  +  ++  +  ++  ++  + 
Echevem'a (1970-76)  +  ++  0  +  +  ++ 
Perez (1974-78)  +  ++  0  +  +  ++ 
Nore: + + = very importanUlarge; + = moderately important/large; 0 = not importanVlarge. Entries represent peak of  populism 
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groups constituted  the primary  support  base  of  the  governments in power. 
This reflected the historical origins of the parties or coalitions led by Peron 
(Justicialista) and Allende  (Socialist and Communist).  The APRA (Alianza 
Populara Revolucionavia Americana),  Garcia’s party, has a more complicated 
history. It was never the main representative of organized labor, but Garcia, as 
a candidate of the party’s left wing, attracted much labor and “popular-sector’’ 
support from outside the party. Within the parties themselves, there were al- 
ready substantial numbers of  white-collar workers and professionals. Beyond 
this inherent multiclass character, the decision was made to seek support from 
most  domestically  oriented  business.  These were broad  coalitions that  tar- 
geted only a small group as being outside: the largest domestic business firms 
with close international  ties (“the monopolies,”  as they  were labeled in Al- 
lende’s Chile), foreign business itself, and the landed oligarchy. It was clearly 
recognized that these cross-class alliances would place limits on the policies 
that could be followed, but their numbers  were necessary  to win elections. 
Thus  the  macroeconomic  policies  of  all three governments  focused on the 
populist elements outlined  above. The package of budget deficits,  nominal 
wage increases, and controls was designed to produce growth and distributive 
effects that would appeal to the disparate elements of the coalitions. 
Both  economic and  political  factors distinguished  Echeverria  and  Perez 
from the three governments just discussed. Their coalitions were of the same 
multiclass type, but the relative weight of the popular class and business ele- 
ments varied.  Specifically, business groups were more dominant, while labor 
was relatively weaker.  The negative targeting of  big business/foreigners/oli- 
garchy in  general was not very important, although specific actions were di- 
rected  against individual elements of  these groups.  For example, Perez  na- 
tionalized  the  oil  industry,  and  Echeverria  encouraged  takeovers  of  large 
farms in certain regions. In terms of  macroeconomic policies, the same pack- 
age of measures was followed, but demand stimulation was weaker in Mexico 
and Venezuela. 
In economic as well as political terms, Sarney fell between the two groups 
of governments just discussed. The business/labor relationship in Brazil was 
similar to that in Mexico and Venezuela. In terms of the “enemy,” however, it 
should be noted that Sarney not only initially  advocated an agrarian  reform 
(from which he later retreated), but Brazil also initiated a moratorium on debt 
payments  at two  points  during  the  Sarney  administration.  Macroeconomic 
policies during the  Sarney administration  were similar to those of Allende, 
Peron, and  Garcia with  respect  to budget  deficits  and  wage  increases,  al- 
though the exchange rate was never allowed to become as overvalued. 
Why these coalitions and policies? Our primary hypothesis is that populism 
is  rooted  in the distributive political  struggles that have characterized  Latin 
America  since  the  beginning  of  the  century.  Although  such  distributive 
struggles are ubiquitous in the region, variations in institutional arrangements 
across countries and time periods determine the extent to which they are ex- 19  The Political Economy of  Latin American Populism 
pressed through populist policies. A move away from populism seems to have 
occurred  in  the late  1980s, but  we have doubts about how to interpret  this 
trend. On the one hand, despite the fact that most governments have aban- 
doned populism,  important groups in society still support such policies. On 
the other hand, populist politics-where  workers play a key role-seem  to 
have been displaced by struggles among sectors of capital. Although the mac- 
roeconomic  results are superficially similar, the processes are quite different 
and require more analysis. 
2.2  Latin American Social Structure: Class and Sectoral Inequalities 
Most countries of Latin America are distinguished from those of other re- 
gions by two sets of  structural characteristics, each rooted in the formation of 
strong traditional export oligarchies during the second half of the nineteenth 
~entury.~  The first is a very high concentration of income and assets. Table 2.2 
shows the differences in  income distribution  in comparison  to some of  the 
principal Asian countries. It suggests that income inequality is two and a half 
times as great in Latin America. The average ratio between  the highest and 
lowest quintiles of household income is 21.1 in Latin America and only 8.7 
in East Asia. 
The second  structural  feature is a sharp division between employers  and 
workers in industry  and services versus  the primary  products export sector 
controlled by the traditional oligarchy. Sectoral antagonisms became particu- 
larly pronounced after the 1930s, when the shocks of the Depression encour- 
aged  an  acceleration  of  the  import-substitution  industrialization  (ISI) pro- 
cesses begun earlier in the century, and paved the way for the formation of 
influential new development doctrines-widely  associated with the UN Eco- 
nomic  Commission for Latin America-which  emphasized inward-oriented 
strategies of development.  At the same time, the capacity of  most export oli- 
garchies to block significant land reforms meant that, in contrast to countries 
such as Korea and Taiwan, the political weight of urban popular groups was 
not typically counterbalanced by the presence of a large class of independent 
farmers or small export-oriented manufacturing  firm^.^ 
Sharp  class  and  sectoral  divisions  may  encourage  populist  policy  ap- 
proaches in several ways.  In the first place, there is probably  some link be- 
tween income/asset inequality and redistributive pressures on the government, 
although objective disparities in income rarely constitute a very satisfying ex- 
planation for the mobilization of such pressures.6 
A more important aspect of highly unequal societies is that upper-income 
groups are generally  in  a good  position  to resist  direct  taxation.  This has 
4. Similar points are raised by Sachs (1989). 
5. For comparisons of the situation in Latin America and East Asia, see Haggard (1990) and 
6. On the relationship between income distribution and politics, see Ddhl(1971, pp. 81-105). 
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Table 2.2  Comparison of Income Distribution in Latin America and  East Asia’ 



























































































Source: Adapted from Sachs ( 1989, table  I ) . 
‘Based on national household surveys in the late 1960s or early 1970s 
placed a major limit on the capacity of  Latin American governments to deal 
with distributive pressures within the context of growth-oriented export mod- 
els. In small open European  economies, for example, the expansion of the 
welfare state has been an important political concomitant of liberal trade pol- 
icies.  Transfer  payments  negotiated  through  corporatist  bargaining  institu- 
tions  have  typically  been  employed  to  even  out  the  differential  gains  and 
losses associated with economic adjustments to shifts in the international mar- 
ket (e.g., see Katzenstein 1984, 1985). Since Latin American states had much 
more limited capacity to tax income and assets directly, such open-economy 
welfare state models were far less feasible.  During the  1930s and  1940s, it 
was politically easier to turn to ISI, rather than welfare transfers, in order to 
protect  politically mobilized  working- and middle-class constituencies from 
international market shocks, notwithstanding the higher economic costs.’ 
Urban-oriented populist policies, in turn, can be linked directly to the sharp 
sectoral divisions that emerged within the context of IS1 and the primary ex- 
7. On the issue of sectoral clashes in general, see Mamalakis (1969, 1971). 21  The Political Economy of Latin American Populism 
port sector. Although there is no necessary connection between populism and 
1.31,  and the latter was accompanied by fairly orthodox macroeconomic poli- 
cies in some instances (e.g.,  Chile and Colombia in the  1960s), in practice 
there usually has been a link. On the one hand, IS1 provided the intellectual 
justification for policies that, if carried to extremes, resulted in populism. For 
example, the emphasis on the domestic market justified large wage increases 
and higher government  spending.  In addition, high tariffs and/or overvalued 
exchange rates were allowed in order to protect the new industries. 
On the other hand, the industrialization process itself created groups that 
supported such policies.  The IS1 industries,  together with the public sector, 
provided the main source of employment for the groups in the best position to 
mobilize  distributive pressures  against  the government in power:  the  urban 
middle  classes  and  blue-collar  unions.  As producers  of  nontraded  goods, 
these  groups could  capture substantial  short-term  gains  from policies  that 
combine fiscal expansionism and an overvalued currency. Since small groups 
dominate commodity exports in Latin America, governments seeking popular 
support had relatively little to lose in the short term by policies that transfered 
income from the traded goods sector, even though the export elites frequently 
passed the costs of such policies onto the unorganized rural  workers under 
their control. 
Class and sectoral divisions  may  suggest some important answers to the 
question of why  populist policies appear more frequently in Latin America 
than in other regions, but they do little to account for cross-national or over- 
time differences within Latin America itself. There is little or no intraregional 
correlation  between  populist  policy  cycles and  income  distribution.  Such 
cycles have been more frequent in societies with relatively equal income dis- 
tributions,  such as Argentina and Uruguay, than in countries with greater in- 
come concentration, such as Colombia and Venezuela. 
A focus on sectoral divisions, rather than class conflict, provides  a some- 
what better fit with populist experiences.  In the cases of  Argentina and Uru- 
guay,  several  familiar  aspects of the traditional  wheat and livestock  sectors 
have exacerbated conflicts with groups in services and ISI. Since export pro- 
ceeds are generated by only a small fraction of  the total population, they offer 
an especially tempting target for urban-oriented politicians. Moreover,  since 
wheat and livestock are also important wage goods, the distributional effects 
of exchange-rate policy are almost immediately evident to the urban popula- 
tion.* Nevertheless,  intense populist policy cycles have also been played out 
in  countries  with  very  different  types of  export structures (e.g.,  Allende’s 
Chile) as well as in societies with comparatively large rural populations (e.g., 
Brazil under Sarney or Peru under Alan Gar~ia).~ 
8. For an analysis of  these relationship in the Argentine case, see O’Donnell (1978). 
9. See accounts of Allende, Samey, and Garcia in Larrain and Meller (in this volume), Rabello 
de Castro and Ronci (in this volume), and Lago (this volume). See also the comparative analyses 
by  Sachs (1989) and Dombusch and Edwards (this volume). 22  Robert R. Kaufman and Barbara Stallings 
To  understand more fully the conditions under which governments adopt 
populist  policies,  we  need to look at the institutional mechanisms through 
which characteristics of the social structure are translated into political behav- 
ior and policy choice. We examine the impact of two of these in the following 
sections: the influence of the party system and of political regime in determin- 
ing cross-national differences in the intensity and frequency of populist poli- 
cies. 
2.3  Party Systems and Cross-national Differences in Populist Policies 
Party systems in Latin America vary widely across countries, sometimes 
reflecting regional, religious, or personal conflicts that date back to the late 
nineteenth or early twentieth century. A full elaboration of  the historical ori- 
gins or contemporary workings of these systems would take us well beyond 
the scope of  this essay.'O  For our purposes, however, the crucial question to 
ask is the extent to which long-term partisan alignments offer incentives for 
politicians to attempt to form anti-elite coalitions of unions, white-collar em- 
ployees, and import-substituting industrialists. We  argue that these incentives 
are relatively weak in systems where one or two multiclass parties have pro- 
vided governmental elites with stable electoral majorities. They have  been 
much  stronger in societies where popular-sector groups have been linked to 
parties that have been systematically excluded from electoral competition and/ 
or in multiparty systems where competing political elites are unable to orga- 
nize stable electoral majorities.  n] 
Systems characterized by stable electoral blocs include Mexico's dominant 
party system and those of Colombia and Venezuela, where two parties have 
either shared power or rotated in office for the last several decades. In Mexico, 
the dominant party, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Instituto) has until very 
recently encompassed virtually all sectors of  the electorate and maintained 
close organizational links to the union movement. The two-party systems in 
Venezuela and Colombia also aggregate a wide range of interests, although in 
somewhat different ways. In Venezuela, the AD (Accion Democratica) and 
COPE1 each incorporate similar multiclass electoral constituencies and, like 
the Mexican PRI, maintain close links to the labor movement. This has en- 
couraged the two parties to adopt roughly similar macroeconomic approaches 
and has reduced. broad swings in policy when governments change hands. In 
Colombia, the more traditional Liberal and Conservative parties have much 
weaker ties to the organized labor movement than the parties in either Mexico 
or Venezuela and are much more extensively influenced by economic elites. 
As  in the other two countries, however, each of the major parties maintains 
10. For such a historical analysis, see Collier and Collier (1990).  We have relied heavily on this 
11. Arguments in this section parallel those in Haggard and Kaufman (1990). 
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strong  electoral  roots  among  popular-sector  voters,  whose  partisan  alle- 
giances have been passed on from one generation to the next.  l2 
A second pattern is one in which substantial portions of  the popular-sector 
support parties are periodically barred from entering the electoral competition 
by economic and military  elites. The most important examples in this cate- 
gory are the Perbnists in Argentina and the Aprista party in Peru.I3 Even dur- 
ing  periods  of  civilian government,  these  parties  frequently  suffered  pro- 
longed military bans on electoral participation  and/or winning control of  the 
presidency. Because these parties had gained the allegiance of broad portions 
of the electorate, the bans-or  the ongoing threat of them-made  it virtually 
impossible to establish systems based on stable governing majorities.  l4 
The final pattern is one in which fractionalization of the system into a large 
number of narrowly based parties impedes the formation of stable governing 
coalitions. The Chilean party system, with  its  sharp ideological  divisions, 
falls into this category. Prior to the military coup of  1973, shifts in coalitional 
alignments caused control of the presidency to shift between the right, center, 
and left.  Brazil’s multiparty system provides a second example, although in 
this  case, regionalism and  personal  political  rivalries  have  weighed  much 
more heavily in the divisions among the parties. 
The Uruguayan system, finally, should be mentioned as a special case that 
combines several of the patterns discussed above. On the one hand, as in Co- 
lombia  and Venezuela,  two multiclass  parties, the Colorados and Blancos, 
have traditionally dominated electoral contests. At the same time, the “double 
simultaneous voting system” has allowed both of these parties to field three or 
four presidential  candidates,  who frequently  represented  widely  divergent 
policy positions.L6  By the early 1970s, moreover, a new center-left coalition, 
the Frente Amplio, had begun to make major advances as a third electoral 
force, especially within the capital city of Montevideo. 
It  is not  surprising that Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Peru-the  systems 
with exclusionary and/or unstable multiparty patterns-have  been the coun- 
tries most prone to populist policy cycles. Several of  these cycles (Allende, 
12. For an analysis of political parties in Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia, see the following 
sources, respectively: Levy and Szekely (1987), Levine (1989). and Hartlyn (1988). 
13. It should also be noted that there have been extended bans on left or populist parties in other 
systems as well-including  the Chilean Communists between  1948 and 1958 and the Brazilian 
Communists from 1946 to 1964. Unlike the Per6nists and the Apristas, however, these were more 
narrowly based parties that would not have been able to capture the presidency or to dominate the 
legislature if they had been allowed to run. 
14. Peronism and the APRA are discussed, respectively, in Rock (1987) and Bonilla and Drake 
(1989). 
15. On parties in Chile and Brazil, see Cavarozzi andGarreton (1989, pp. 139-242, 335-465). 
16. The double simultaneous voting system functions as a primary and general election rolled 
into one. Voters select both a party and competing candidates within the party. The candidate with 
the most votes of the party with the most votes becomes president. 
17. On parties in Uruguay, see Cavarozzi and Garret6n (1989, pp. 243-96). 24  Robert R.  Kaufman and Barbara Stallings 
Peron, Garcia, and Sarney) have been discussed earlier in this paper and else- 
where in this volume, but there have been many others as well-including  the 
first Peron government in Argentina, Vargas and Goulart in Brazil, Ibaiiez in 
Chile, and Velasco in Peru. 
Several types of  political incentives help to account for these tendencies. 
On the one hand, for the leaders of  periodically excluded multiclass parties 
such as the Peronists and the Apristas, broad distributive appeals to workers 
and industrialists have been a way to mobilize the support necessary to regain 
entry into electoral politics and to consolidate power on occasions in which 
they have been allowed to take office. More narrowly based working-class 
parties such as the Chilean Communists and Socialists face similar incentives. 
Cross-class distributive  appeals  to  middle-sector groups  and  industrialists 
were perceived by  many leaders of  Allende’s Popular Unity government as 
crucial means of avoiding political isolation and stabilizing the governing co- 
alition. Finally, in highly fragmented multiparty systems such as Brazil’s, one 
or more of  the competing segments of the divided “political class” typically 
faces a strong temptation to strengthen its electoral position by  appealing to 
the distributive interests of politically available working-class groups. 
Political leaders in countries with more stable electoral blocs have some- 
times engaged in similar strategies. Compared to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
and Peru, however, populist politicians in these systems have generally had a 
harder time winning office and face greater constraints when they do arrive. It 
is more difficult for populist challengers to win office precisely because they 
must compete within the framework of broadly based governing parties that 
already claim substantial support among working-class voters. Once in office, 
political leaders such as Echeverria or PCrez,  who are inclined to cultivate 
popular-sector support,  face opposition within  their own  ruling coalitions 
from factions that seek closer ties with economic elites. A brief survey of the 
macroeconomic experiences of these countries illustrates these points. 
Venezuela experienced a brief period of distributive populism under Carlos 
AndrCs PCrez in the mid-1970s; since the late 1970s, however, both AD and 
COPE1 governments have exercised tight monetary  and fiscal controls. In- 
deed, since his reelection to the presidency in 1989, Perez himself has backed 
very  tough  stabilization policies and a wide-ranging program of  liberal re- 
forms in the Venezuelan economy.  In Colombia, traditionally cautious fiscal 
and monetary policies were challenged by the nearly successful populist cam- 
paign of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in  1970 as well as by the demand-expansion 
policies initiated by Belisario Betancur in the early 1980s. Nevertheless, with 
both major parties still heavily influenced by coffee and financial elites and a 
high priority on consensus, macroeconomic policy has been consistently more 
conservative than in most of the other countries.  l9 
18. Populist policies under Carlos Andres Perez are analyzed in Karl (forthcoming). 
19. Economic policies in Colombia, and the absence of populism, are discussed in Urrutia (in 
this volume). 25  The Political Economy of  Latin American Populism 
Mexico  has  exhibited  more  extensive  political  polarization  and  policy 
swings than Colombia and Venezuela, but these have still been relatively mild 
compared to those of  the South American populists. Expansionist policies 
pursued under Echeverria-intended  to deflect growing left-wing militancy 
among unions,  students, and the peasantry-did  lead to serious macroeco- 
nomic disequilibria during the  1970s. After 1982, however, the capacity of 
the PRI to dominate both the electorate and organized labor made it possible 
for more orthodox factions of the party to engineer a sharp change in policy 
direction without major political upheavals. Such a shift might possibly have 
come even earlier if the oil boom of 1978-1981 had not temporarily alleviated 
the exchange crisis of the mid-1970~.~~ 
Long-term macroeconomic experience in  Uruguay, finally, appears to re- 
flect the complex mix of  features within its party system. On the one hand, 
institutionalized factionalism within each of the major parties made it difficult 
for civilian governments of the 1950s and 1960s to deal effectively with infla- 
tionary pressures and external accounts problems rooted in conflicts between 
agro-export elites  and  urban-based popular-sector groups. By  1973, these 
conflicts had culminated in political polarization and a military coup. On the 
other hand, the nonideological character of the two major parties does appear 
to have had an effect on economic policy. From the early 1950s to the 1973 
coup, all civilian presidents represented centrist or right-wing factions of their 
respective parties. Although none was  able effectively to stabilize the econ- 
omy, none systematically used expansionist policies to mobilize support from 
a popular-sector coalition. Centripetal tendencies within the major parties also 
appear to have played a role during the democratic transition of the  1980s. 
Centrist factions predominated in both parties in the presidential contest of 
1984, and there was a greater emphasis on wage and fiscal restraint than was 
the case during comparable transitions in Argentina and Brazil.21 
2.4  The Role of Political Regimes and Regime Change 
We  consider the nature of the principal sociopolitical cleavages in  society, 
as reflected in the political party system, to be the single most important factor 
in explaining differences in populist tendencies across Latin American coun- 
tries. Nevertheless, the rules that govern political interaction-such  as type 
of  political regime, characteristics of institutions, and timing of elections (if 
any)-are  also important. They can reinforce the influence of party structure; 
they can also temporarily mute it. As will be discussed in the next section, 
however, these rules are more easily changed than the cleavages themselves. 
Of  course, the two are not completely independent, as seen in the Uruguayan 
case, but it is usually possible to separate their role for the purposes of  anal- 
ysis. 
20. On economic policies in Mexico, see Bazdresch and Levy (in this volume) 
2 I. Uruguayan policies are discussed in Noya and Rama (1988). 26  Robert R. Kaufman and Barbara Stallings 
In the Latin American context, observers have tended to separate political 
regimes into the categories “authoritarian” and  “democratic.” In  an earlier 
study, we  found it useful to add the category of  “transitional democracies” 
(Kaufman and Stallings 1989). We defined authoritarian regimes as those that 
do not permit competitive elections; they restrict the space allowed to either 
oppositional or interest group activity. Democratic regimes, by contrast, were 
characterized as ones where a government must win and retain power through 
competitive elections, tolerate opposition challenges to its incumbency, and 
deal with relatively independent interest groups. A transitional democracy is 
one that has recently changed from authoritarian to democratic; several turn- 
overs of government need to be accomplished before a democracy can safely 
be considered as consolidated. 
An authoritarian regime affects a political system by preventing underlying 
divisions from manifesting themselves for a certain period. Elections can be 
suspended, parties and interest groups outlawed, and congress closed. Also 
the conditions that led to a military intervention (the most frequent type of 
authoritarian regime) can themselves submerge societal divisions in the short 
run. Under these circumstances, populist policies are unlikely, since the gov- 
ernment is not primarily reliant on public support. Nevertheless, the end of an 
authoritarian period may produce populist-like policies aimed at softening the 
military’s reputation before they return to the barracks.  22 
In the longer run, an authoritarian regime will inevitably be replaced, lead- 
ing to a transitional democracy. There are several reasons why a transitional 
democracy will be especially susceptible to populist policies. First, authori- 
tarian regimes (and thus transitional democracies) are most likely to occur in 
countries with exclusionary or unstable multiparty systems, which have al- 
ready been identified with populist tendencies. Second, transitional democra- 
cies face considerable pent-up  economic demand from  their  constituents. 
Third, in the new democracies, institutional uncertainties tend to shorten the 
time horizons of  both the incumbent governments and  their opponents. For 
such governments, there is a premium for meeting distributive expectations 
early in  the administration and a substantial discount for the political risks 
attached to later problems with the balance of payments and inflation. Institu- 
tional uncertainty and shortened time horizons likewise affect the calculus of 
opposition political parties and other economic actors. Without some expec- 
tation that they will be able to share in future gains from growth, it may make 
sense for labor and other popular-sector groups to seek “unrealistic” nominal 
wage gains even if they know that these will later be wiped out by  inflation. 
Finally, like authoritarian systems, consolidated democracies are less likely 
than transitional democracies to experiment with populism. The reasons are 
22. Argentina in  1982-83 would be an example of  this phenomenon. It should be pointed out, 
however, that these are populist policies, not a populist government. The political coalition of  the 
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essentially the opposite of those prevailing in transitional situations. Consoli- 
dated democracies tend to be found in systems with stable governing electoral 
blocs; by  definition,  abrupt changes of  regime are less likely.  Also,  with 
longer time horizons, it may pay for a newly elected president to impose un- 
popular policies early in his or her term in order to reap the political payoffs 
of later success. Moreover, unlike an authoritarian regime, a consolidated de- 
mocracy does not rely as heavily on  satisfying material demands, since its 
legitimacy derives from political as well as economic factors. 
Some empirical support for these propositions was found in  our study re- 
ferred to above. At least for the 1980s, we found a high correlation between 
type  of  regime  and  choice  of  economic policies.  These relationships are 
shown in table 2.3. The analysis showed that authoritarian regimes (Chile and 
Mexico) were most likely to choose orthodox macroeconomic policies and to 
take significant steps toward liberalization and privatization. Established de- 
mocracies (Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica in our study) were also as- 
sociated with orthodox macro policies but did little with respect to structural 
change. It was the transitional democracies (Peru, Argentina, and Brazil) that 
followed populist policies. Uruguay was the exception to our analysis. It was 
a transitional democracy but behaved more like the consolidated democracies. 
Our explanation was focused on the nature of the political system, a two-party 
system, similar to those of Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica. 
2.5  Repetition of Populist Cycles and Problems of Political Learning 
Countries vary  not  only with  respect to  the  intensity  of  populist  policy 
cycles, but with respect to the recurrence of those cycles. As suggested above, 
Argentina, Chile,  Brazil,  and Peru have each experienced several episodes 
that approximate the populist policy cycles outlined by  Dornbusch and Ed- 
wards, whereas other countries discussed in this essay have experienced no 
more than one. The most severe episodes,  in terms of  macroeconomic dis- 
equilibria and political polarization, are listed in table 2.4. The table does not 
include a fairly large number of briefer or less extreme populist initiatives- 
for example, those of Frondizi in 1958 or Alfonsin in 1984. 
Such patterns are not necessarily immutable. In principle, they may change 
either because social actors learn from earlier experiences and/or because they 
are forced to adapt to new conditions in the present. In the final section, we 
examine the influence of  some of  the comparatively new international condi- 
tions that emerged during the decade of  the  1980s. Here we  offer some hy- 
potheses about the possibilities for learning from the past. 
There are two variants of the argument that the lessons drawn from earlier 
experiences can eventually bring an end to populist policy cycles. The first is 
that repeated iterations of  cycles in which “everyone loses” will eventually 
encourage more cooperative attempts to find nonpopulist policy alternatives. 
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discipline is  likely  to  be  greater  if  the consequences (or perceived  conse- 
quences) of populist policies have been especially bad. 
Although both of these hypotheses are plausible, the empirical support for 
them is ambiguous. In Chile since 1984, there are preliminary indications that 
some social learning has occurred. Most of the major party leaders of the Left 
and Center have indicated that they intend to avoid the mistakes of the Allende 
years by adopting a much more cautious macroeconomic approach. “Social 
learning,” however, does not account fully for these changes in orientation. 
The changes must also be explained in terms of the global and regional pres- 
sures that have operated throughout Latin America during the  1980s, and- 
even more important-by  the structural changes imposed during the Pinochet 
era. The latter include a severe economic weakening of the urban-industrial 
base  of  leftist  support,  and the emergence of  new commercial-agricultural 
groups with  strong interests in the maintenance of  export-led growth mod- 
In other countries, particularly prior to the  1980s, there is even less evi- 
dence that past experiences in  themselves have been sufficient inducements 
for changes in policy orientation. Neither the Peronist episodes in Argentina 
nor the experience with Goulart in Brazil inoculated those countries against 
the subsequent resurfacing of populist “temptations.” The same is true with 
respect to the relation between Velasco in the early 1970s and Alan Garcia a 
decade later. 
What have been the impediments to more effective long-term adjustments 
in policy behavior? Before turning in the next section to conditions that might 
diminish the likelihood of repeated populist cycles, it is important to highlight 
eiS.23 
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several factors that have contributed to a maintenance of the pattern. First, and 
most obvious, many of the same political and institutional factors that help to 
explain the intensity of populist  policy episodes have also encouraged their 
recurrence. The possibility  of new rounds of  populism  has been  highest  in 
systems where severe electoral rivalries encourage an emphasis on redistribu- 
tive issues and/or the exclusion of partisan adversaries. Similarly, where ten- 
ure insecurities have limited the time horizons of governments, officials have 
tended to discount heavily the longer-term costs of  populist policy choices. 
The second concerns the way  in  which  social  actors have  perceived  the 
alternatives  to populist  macroeconomic policies.  Although  some countries 
(e.g., Colombia) have had considerable success with mixed economy models, 
a great deal of the ideological  debate in  Latin America  has focused on the 
relative merits of  more orthodox approaches  urged by  international lending 
agencies and developed-country governments. Evidence  about  the  positive 
social welfare effects of this alternative, however, has been mixed at best and 
has in general provided governments with very little incentive for abandoning 
comparatively  activist fiscal and monetary policies.  The most notable excep- 
tion is Chile where-despite  the extraordinary hardships imposed under Pin- 
ochet-the  post- 1984 recovery did contribute to a reorientation of  economic 
policy perspectives.  In most cases (including  Chile itself), the most visible 
short-term effect of this alternative has been to transfer resources from urban 
wage earners to exporters and financial 
Finally, it should not be surprising that iterations of populist/orthodox  pol- 
icy cycles have been as likely to reinforce self-fulfilling zero-sum assumptions 
as to encourage a convergence around common welfare interests.  Especially 
in countries like Argentina, the historical record itself has placed competing 
sociopolitical  groups in prisoner’s dilemma situations, in which  the groups 
must choose between the possibility of achieving mutual gains from coopera- 
tive behavior and the high costs they must bear if they cooperate and others 
defect. Even after repeated iterations, there is no single “equilibrium solution” 
to this game. It may be just as rational to seek short-term distributive advan- 
tages as to collaborate in support of more disciplined fiscal and monetary pol- 
icies. 
2.6  Prospects for the Future 
What are the possibilities  that  such vicious circles can be reversed over a 
longer time period? Events in the last few years suggest a changing  policy 
climate in the region. On the one hand, voters in a number of countries have 
elected leaders who openly ran  on antipopulist  platforms. These would  in- 
clude Aylwin in Chile, Collor in Brazil, Lacalle in Uruguay, and Chamorro in 
24. Negative outcomes of orthodoxy are analyzed in Sheahan (1987). Pastor (1987) and Weeks 
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Nicaragua. On the other hand, several new presidents who had been expected 
to follow populist policies-Mentm  in Argentina,  Perez in Venezuela, Man- 
ley in Jamaica, and Borja in Ecuador-changed  their stance once in office. It 
appears that Fujimori  in Peru will do the same. But how enduring are these 
policy trends, and what are the chances that they will continue to receive pub- 
lic support? 
Within the international  system, there have been changes at both the eco- 
nomic and ideological levels that have reduced the viability of populist poli- 
cies operating within an IS1 framework. The most important economic change 
is the cutoff of external finance to Latin American  governments.  The avail- 
ability of  public-sector  funds in the 1960s, and especially private bank loans 
in the 197Os, made it possible for governments to run trade and budget defi- 
cits. When this  financing dried up following  the Mexican crisis of  August 
1982, they had to choose between populist policies and debt service. It is not 
surprising that the choices generally followed the pattern outlined earlier. That 
is, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Uruguay squeezed their populations in 
order to maintain debt service, while Brazil, Argentina, and especially Peru 
took the opposite path. The exception was Chile, whose military government 
had made substantial changes in that country’s political alignments and eco- 
nomic policy choices in comparison with the Allende administration and ear- 
lier years.25 
The change in material  conditions was reinforced  by  a significant shift in 
the intellectual climate in many parts of the world during the 1980s. The most 
important was in the United States, where the Reagan government not only 
changed U.S.  priorities  (or at least rhetoric)  but also put  pressure  on other 
governments to carry out tight fiscal and monetary policies as well as to limit 
the role of the public sector. The U.S. voice in the international financial in- 
stitutions  was  influential in  forcing  similar  policies  to be incorporated  into 
those institutions’ programs for Third World countries. At least as important, 
however,  was the demonstration effect of different parts of the Third World. 
As Latin America and Africa became mired in recession with no end in sight, 
the Asian newly  industrialized  countries (NlCs) suffered only small fluctua- 
tions  in their  growth  patterns  and then continued their upward trajectories. 
Although it was recognized that some misrepresentations were being made in 
the  analysis of  the policies followed  in Asia, it  was nevertheless clear that 
populism  and IS1 were  much less prevalent  in that region. The lesson  ex- 
tracted was that the latter two characteristics  were responsible  for many of 
Latin America’s problems.26 
A second important change has been the shift in the intellectual and politi- 
cal discourse within Latin America itself  in favor of greater fiscal restraint, 
25. On different responses to the debt crisis, see Frieden (1989). 
26. On the East Asian cases and the lessons drawn by  Latin America, see Haggard (1990) and 
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trade liberalization, and privatization. Although this shift was conditioned by 
the international developments just discussed, by  the end of the 1980s it had 
been  buttressed by  sharp contrasts  in the  experience of  specific countries 
within the region itself. On the one hand, in Chile, where the Pinochet gov- 
ernment had  pursued highly orthodox economic strategies, there was  sub- 
stantial growth and comparatively low inflation after 1984. Conversely, new 
democratic governments in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru had all engaged in 
heterodox experiments aimed at protecting popular-sector incomes, and these 
countries were mired in the worst economic crises in their modem history. 
Although the policy implications are far from clear, lessons have nevertheless 
been drawn. 
Among competing economic interests, finally, there have  been important 
changes in access to resources and new divisions that cut across old class and 
sectoral lines. Even before the debt crisis, the liberalization of capital markets 
had opened up major new opportunities for the growth of the financial sector. 
At  the same time, although there is still considerable uncertainty about the 
distributional consequences of the debt crisis, the cutoff of external financing 
appears to have seriously weakened important components of popular-sector 
coalitions. Public employees have generally been hit hard, with wages declin- 
ing at a faster rate than in the private sector. Business groups that are espe- 
cially dependent on state subsidies or contracts have also been  particularly 
disadvantaged. Such changes alter the balance of power among segments of 
union and business organizations and diminish the capacity of such organiza- 
tions to mobilize strong political opposition to market-oriented adjustments. 
The weakening of “rent-seeking” groups, in turn, increases the political lati- 
tude available for governments seeking to push through stabilization measures 
and market-oriented reforms. 
What does this analysis suggest about future outcomes? There seem to be 
four possible scenarios on the horizon.  First,  the market-oriented policies 
might yield significant improvements in growth rates, employment opportu- 
nities, and price stability over the medium run. If this were to happen, public 
support for such policies would increase. For long-run stability and conti- 
nuity, of course, it would still be necessary to mobilize the beneficiaries into 
political support groups and  to establish institutional arrangements within 
which they could operate. 
Even if  reasonably positive results do occur in terms of growth, however, 
opposition is likely to increase if the benefits are distributed in a very skewed 
manner, This was clearly part of the reason for the defeat of the military gov- 
ernment and its presidential candidate in Chile. A second strategy, then, is a 
set of policies that maintain the emphasis on balanced accounts and competi- 
tiveness but place equal weight on policies geared toward increased equity. 
These include social policies as well  as wages and benefits.  The potential 
support for such a coalition is vast, but the economic policies would be ex- 
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If  the new market-based policies do not produce positive medium-term re- 
sults, opposition will increase and, in spite of the weakening of the traditional 
support bases of populism, a return to populist cycles could occur in at least 
some countries. In the recent Brazilian presidential election, the candidate of 
the left, running on a very traditional populist platform, was only narrowly 
defeated by  the antipopulist Fernando Collor. And  in Mexico, Cuauhtemoc 
Cirdenas, also running on populist principles, mobilized the most  serious 
electoral challenge ever launched against a candidate of  the dominant PRI. 
Whether such candidates, once in office, would actually implement populist 
policies cannot be determined in advance. Like Menem and Perez, they might 
betray the voters’ expectations. If they did try to implement populist policies, 
the situation could quickly degenerate into chaos as seen in  recent years in 
Peru. 
New  populist experiments in  a world  where international finance is not 
readily available is one route to a fourth alternative: a disintegration of civil 
society and a steady deterioration in the capacity of  state authorities to frame 
and  implement  policy  alternatives  of  any  sort.  In  circumstances  where 
popular-sector groups have been  badly  weakened,  and  a coalition around 
market-based policies has not been mobilized, this final alternative cannot be 
ruled out. At the present time, contemporary Peru perhaps best approximates 
this situation-although  it is by  no means the only country where it could 
happen. As the 1990s begin, the problems faced by this society is rooted not 
so much in conflicts between populism and orthodoxy as in the institutional 
fragmentation of parties and political coalitions, atomized competition among 
business groups, and self-fulfilling bets against the government’s capacity to 
control prices or guarantee order. In other words, the problem is no longer 
class or sectoral conflict, but a decline in the capacity for collective action of 
any sort. 
Prediction about the relative likelihood of the four scenarios for the region 
as a whole is impossible. On the contrary, it seems clear that Latin America 
will  see  ever-greater differentiation among  countries.  Indeed, each of  the 
scenarios is likely to appear somewhere in the region.  For any individual 
country, the situation will depend on political organization as well  as eco- 
nomic outcomes. 
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Comment  Paul W.  Drake 
To  understand the political economy of populism in Latin America, it is nec- 
essary to explore the forces driving that phenomenon. Robert R. Kaufman 
and Barbara Stallings provide an excellent beginning for that task. Their work 
can be complemented with a longer historical perspective. As they suggest, 
Latin  American populism cannot be explained as an  irrational  set of  self- 
destructive economic measures to redistribute income through deficit spend- 
ing. Behind those policies is a political logic that propels the emergence and 
recurrence of  populist  programs despite the cautionary  advice of  orthodox 
economists. 
Historical Definition 
Populism is not new in Latin America. To  the contrary, the heyday of pop- 
ulism is past. Historically the term referred to a reasonably definable category 
of political actors and proposals. To illuminate that record and its current man- 
ifestations, it is important to distinguish among populist movements, policies, 
and governments.  I 
Populist Movements 
As a political  movement, populism has been quite common since World 
War I and will continue to surface in some countries. Prime examples would 
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include Victor Raul Haya de la Torre and the American Popular Revolutionary 
Alliance (APRA) in Peru from the 1920s to the 1970s, the Chilean Socialist 
party in the 1930s, Jorge EliCcer Gaitan in Colombia in the  1940s, R6mulo 
Betancourt and Democratic Action in Venezuela prior to the 1950s, and some 
aspects of the campaigns of JosC Maria Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador over several 
decades. Most of these movements were characterized by three key features: 
( 1) paternalistic, personalistic, often charismatic leadership and mobilization 
from the  top down; (2) multiclass incorporation of  the  masses, especially 
urban workers but also middle sectors; and (3) integrationist, reformist, na- 
tionalist  development  programs  for  the  state  to  promote  simultaneously 
import-substituting industrialization and redistributive measures for populist 
supporters. 
These  three  essential  ingredients  of  populism  were  logically  intercon- 
nected. Ideally, a charismatic leader welded together a polyclass coalition to 
compromise on the coterminus expansion of industry and social welfare. Such 
a movement fitted the historical circumstances and structural conditions in 
highly agrarian countries that had not yet used the government significantly to 
foment industry and to assimilate emergent urban groups into national poli- 
tics.  Populism provided  a  coherent  political response  to  the  dislocations 
caused by the increasing tempo of industrialization, social differentiation, and 
urbanization. 
By the same token, such movements might be expected still in the poorer 
countries of Latin America that have not advanced very far in the elaboration 
of national industry and an inclusive political system, for example, in Central 
America. It will still be tempting for politicians to create a new constituency 
by  galvanizing the urban underprivileged. Elsewhere,  echoes of  populism 
may reverberate in nations that have already gone through such experiences, 
because of the continuing inadequacies of  development and the maldistribu- 
tion of  income. Populist rhetoric and promises retain widespread appeal, as 
seen with the electoral surge of CuauhtCmoc Cfirdenas in Mexico in 1988 and 
Luis Inacio da Silva (“Lula”) in Brazil in  1989. 
In countries that have already had a lengthy history of populism, however, 
“bait-and-switch” populists have now become more common. They reflect the 
contradiction today between the immiseration of  the majority of  the popula- 
tion and the imperatives for neoliberal economic restructuring to favor market 
mechanisms and to honor the foreign debt. These putative populists awaken 
hopes of  massive redistributionist policies on the campaign trail but imple- 
ment free-market austerity packages once in office. “Baiters and switchers” 
may sincerely desire to revive an emphasis on social justice, but current re- 
source constraints frequently consign such plans to the dustbin. Recent ex- 
amples would include Carlos AndrCs PCrez in Venezuela, Michael Manley in 
Jamaica, Rodrigo Borja in Ecuador, Jaime Paz Zamora in Bolivia, and Carlos 
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Populist Policies 
Like Populist movements, populist policies have been fairly common in the 
twentieth century. A certain set of initiatives and instruments has become as- 
sociated with populist attempts to ram through rapid industrialization and re- 
distribution.  Traditional populist policies have included tariff protection and 
subsidized credits for industry, discrimination against agriculture and exports, 
wage  hikes, deficit  spending, and  proliferation  of  state planning,  employ- 
ment,  and welfare agencies.  However,  some combinations of these policies 
have also been tried by many Latin American governments without a populist 
leadership, social base, or reform agenda; they have been enacted for reasons 
other than the incorporation of neglected urban sectors, including foreign ex- 
change constraints,  revenue shortages, and pressures from organized interest 
groups. Although the policy outcomes may have been quite similar, the policy 
causes were quite different. 
Populist Governments 
In contrast with populist movements or policies,  full-blown populist gov- 
ernments  with a magnetic  inspirational  leader, a multiclass urban clientele, 
and a hothouse program to raise domestic demand and production have been 
rarer. The classic models are Argentina under Juan Per6n (1946-55,  1973- 
76), Brazil in the democratic period of  Getulio Vargas and his heirs (1951- 
64), and Peru under Alan Garcia (1985-90).  Other contenders might include 
many facets of Lazar0 Cirdenas in Mexico in the 1930s, the Popular Front in 
Chile before World War 11,  the National Revolutionary Movement in Bolivia 
in the 1950s, and Juan Velasco in Peru, 1968-75. 
The quintessential  populist administrations have undergone fairly predict- 
able experiences. They enjoyed a couple of years of successful redistribution 
and expansion through Keynesian deficit spending. That buoyant moment was 
followed by  demand  exceeding  supply,  as investment  and  growth declined 
because of bottlenecks constricting capital, government revenues, and foreign 
exchange. As  a result,  deficits and  inflation  ballooned,  eroding  the  initial 
gains for the poor. While scarcities dimmed the luster of  the popular leader, 
conflicts erupted among his or her multiclass backers, especially between in- 
dustrialists and laborers. On the heels of the spiraling economic and political 
crisis often came authoritarian repression of popular expectations,  demands, 
and  mobilization.  The state clamped down on the lower classes in order to 
facilitate macroeconomic stabilization, government austerity, and capital reac- 
cumulation for renewed growth. Although failing to achieve their higher ob- 
jectives, populists bequeathed a residue of greater industrial capacity and en- 
hanced  leverage for organized  labor. Moreover,  the memories of their early 
good years, in contrast with the harsh period that followed, left a reservoir of 
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These populists must be differentiated from superficially similar nonpopul- 
ist cases. Neither more leftist governments pursuing socialist aspirations nor 
more rightist administrations failing to hold the line on deficits and inflation 
really belong in the populist camp. Their policies are not a result of reformist 
movements energized by  efforts to accelerate capitalist industrialization and 
worker integration. 
Salvador Allende in Chile (1970-73) led a socialist, not a populist, move- 
ment and government, though he  employed some populist policies his first 
year. He sought to move the country toward socialism, not just to reform the 
capitalist system to incorporate workers. Allende’s leadership was neither pa- 
ternalistic nor charismatic. His social base concentrated far more on the work- 
ing class than any multiclass movement, stretching from dissident industrial- 
ists to the lumpenproletariat;  class conflict was far more pronounced than class 
collaboration. Allende’s government preferred to expropriate, not foment, in- 
dustry. Whereas populism signifies redistribution of  income, socialism de- 
notes redistribution of property and wealth. 
JosC Sarney of Brazil (1985-90) is an even more unlikely candidate for any 
pantheon of populists. This accidental president was scarcely the fiery cham- 
pion of an aggressive mass movement dedicated to economic modernization 
and social justice. Rather, Sarney was a conservative who proved too weak to 
impose a stabilization program in the face of concerted opposition from vested 
interests and international circumstances. His inability to surmount the eco- 
nomic crisis of the  1980s was not due to his dedication to populist forces. 
Sarney’s style, coalition, and objectives were a far cry from those of  true 
Brazilian populists like Jo50 Goulart and Leone1 Brizola. 
Historical Phases 
Latin American populism has gone through three stages: early, classic, and 
late. The “early” populists appeared in the opening decades of the twentieth 
century in  the more prosperous countries. As  the strains of  urban  growth 
eroded upper-class hegemony, populist precursors protested insufficient state 
attention to disaffected elites, emergent middle classes, and, to a lesser extent, 
nascent labor groups. These moderate leaders advocated liberal reforms to 
open up aristocratic political systems to greater participation for the literate 
few.  Examples would  include Arturo Alessandri in  Chile and  Hip6lito Iri- 
goyen in Argentina. 
Populism  flourished following the  disruptions of  international trade  by 
World  War  I, the Great Depression, and  World  War  11.  In  the aftermath of 
those shocks, discontent with laissez-faire economics and with exclusionary 
political systems swept the more advanced republics of the hemisphere. The 
traditional oligarchic order faced a fourfold crisis of growth, distribution, par- 
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ization, state welfare, worker mobilization, and mass support for the govern- 
ment. 
During the  1930s and  1940s, the “classic”  populists  took  center stage. 
Compared to their predecessors, they were more dedicated to the urban work- 
ing  class and to socialistic  visions  of  government  reform. Their programs 
mainly resulted  in state capitalist promotion  of industry and urban welfare. 
They relied on renegade elite leadership and cooperation, especially from in- 
dustrialists, intellectuals, and the middle class. For some elites, the costs of 
excluding segments of the working class-strikes,  protests,  ideological radi- 
calization, and so on-seemed  to exceed the costs of  including them through 
mild reforms. Populists mobilized, enfranchised, and incorporated previously 
marginal lower-class groups (particularly urban workers) and continued to ex- 
clude others (particularly peasants). These classic populists proved most suc- 
cessful when periods of growth generated temporary  surpluses after periods 
of recession and austerity. 
After the heady days from the 1930s to the 1960s, populism waned in the 
leading countries for several reasons. The relatively easy stage of replacing 
manufactured consumer goods from abroad was exhausted. At the same time 
as economic resources tightened, the number of  organized and voluble con- 
tenders-rural-urban  migrants, peasants, women, and so on-for  incorpora- 
tion and redistribution multiplied. In several countries, privileged groups con- 
cluded that the costs of including the masses-inflation,  property transfers, 
and the like-exceeded  the costs of excluding them; many elites opted for 
expelling previously incorporated lower-class elements from the crowded po- 
litical arena. Populist coalitions among industrialists and workers unraveled. 
Rightist groups lashed populists as demagogues who spurred excessive mass 
expectations and inflation. At the same time, leftists denounced populists as 
charlatans who duped the workers into settling for reform instead of revolu- 
tion. 
Into this  unpropitious  environment in the  1970s and  1980s strode “late” 
populists like Luis Echeverria in Mexico, Juan Per&  in Argentina, and Alan 
Garcia in Peru. They found it increasingly difficult to revitalize the populist 
alliances and programs of  earlier years. The network of entrenched interests 
and demands had become too thick, the state too cumbersome and burdened, 
the economy too inefficient, inflation too relentless.  Repressed in some coun- 
tries, spumed in others, populism became less viable as a governing formula, 
even when it retained favor as an electoral device. 
As the 1980s unfolded, populist governments, except for the anachronistic 
APRA administration  in Peru, did not exercise power,  despite rumblings at 
the ballot box. Almost regardless of  who got elected president, populist poli- 
cies were discredited  and discarded in most of the hemisphere.  As Kaufman 
and Stallings point out, there are several reasons for the paucity of populist 
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The recession of  the early 1980s, the debt crisis, and the perceived need for 
market-oriented restructuring to reignite growth have convinced most leaders 
that resources are inadequate for swift redress of income inequalities. At the 
same  time,  import-substituting  industrialization  and  other  policies  once 
promulgated by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America have been 
eclipsed by neoliberal economic formulas. Free enterprise solutions modeled 
after the East Asian success stories are in vogue.  It has become fashionable 
and virtually  unavoidable  to reduce government interference with domestic 
and international  markets.  Partly as a result of those economic transforma- 
tions, the long-standing enemies of populism-capitalist  and export elites- 
have been  strengthened,  while the  stalwarts of  populism-organized  labor 
and the urban masses-have  been weakened. Furthermore, after years of au- 
thoritarian repression of labor and the left, reformist politicians have tried to 
restrain populist impulses so as not to capsize democratization. Consequently, 
populism seems unlikely to sweep the Americas anytime soon. 
So long as populism is in retreat, the most pressing issue in the 1990s is not 
how  to stamp out the vestiges.  Rather,  the key question is how to address, 
better than populism did, the burning issues of severely unequal distribution 
without sacrificing growth and stability. The problem is how to bridge the gap 
between the political, electoral logic of speaking to the desperate needs of the 
deprived majority and the economic, governing logic of adhering to the re- 
quirements  of  investors and entrepreneurs.  In democratic political  systems, 
the  trick  is  to  design  a  new  winning  coalition  that  can  sustain  equitable 
growth. Today, most of Latin America is plagued with poverty, not populism. 
Comment  Alberto Alesina 
Robert Kaufman and Barbara Stallings have written an interesting paper that 
emphasizes the effects of income inequality on political  polarization and on 
populist experiments.  I quite agree with their approach. In fact, in my view, 
explaining populism amounts to explaining why is it that economic policy in 
Latin America has been so polarized; that is, why we observe major swings in 
the orientation of economic policy in this part of the world. 
A crucial  characteristic  of  populist  experiments  is the use of  macroeco- 
nomic  policy  to  achieve  redistributional  goals  in  favor  of  certain  social 
groups. Thus, it is not surprising that these experiments are often followed by 
reactions  against  those  same groups  when  the  latter lose political  control. 
Kaufman  and  Stallings  argue  that  this  political  polarization  arises  from 
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income inequality: this phenomenon would explain important differences be- 
tween  Latin American  and Asian countries.  However,  as the authors them- 
selves acknowledge, income  inequality alone cannot account for the differ- 
ences in policy experiments in different Latin American countries. 
As  additional  explanations, the  authors  refer to various  kinds of  institu- 
tional arrangements. One question, which is not sufficiently addressed in this 
respect,  is whether these institutional arrangements are exogenous or endog- 
enous. More specifically, are these arrangements themselves a function of var- 
ious socioeconomic  forces, such as income inequality, or do they affect the 
socioeconomic  characteristics  of  different  countries?  Perhaps the  answer is 
that both directions of causality are important. Examples of institutional char- 
acteristics that may affect economic policy-making include different kinds of 
electoral  rules (say,  the  degree of  proportionality  of  the  electoral  system, 
which may affect the degree of fragmentation of the party system), the exis- 
tence of  constitutional  rules  that are institutionally difficult to change (say, 
because they require qualified majorities in the legislature), systems of checks 
and balances between various branches of government, and the degree of in- 
dependence of the Central Bank. 
Different degrees of political polarization can also be the result of  different 
histories. A country history may be the result of two types of equilibria. One 
is the cooperative equilibrium: when a party or group is in office, it does not 
pursue extreme redistributive policies, expecting that its opponents will do the 
same (i.e., they will be moderate) when they will be in office in the future. In 
the noncooperative equilibrium this implicit cooperation is broken, and when 
a group controls  policy,  it pursues  radical  redistributions,  knowing that an 
economic “revenge” will follow, when political power changes hands. When 
a country is trapped in the noncooperative equilibrium, it may be very hard to 
move away from it, since one group has to begin to act in a “moderate” way, 
even though history indicates that its adversaries have never been cooperative. 
Different institutional arrangements, such as those mentioned earlier, may af- 
fect the likelihood that a country is trapped or not in the noncooperative equi- 
librium. 
The basic problem that underlies much of  the discussion on political polar- 
ization, is that these radical swings of policy, back and forth, from and toward 
populism,  imply aggregate inefficiencies.  It is worthwhile to summarize why 
it is that political polarization leads to losses in aggregate welfare. Three re- 
lated arguments can be made. 
1. Political polarization leads to high uncertainty about future policies or 
even about property rights. This, in turn, leads to difficulties in making long- 
run  economic  decisions  such as investments  in plants  and equipments.  In- 
stead, economic agents may find it more profitable to engage in capital flights. 
The latter reduce taxable resources in the country, leading to a worsening of 
the fiscal situation. As the fiscal crises deteriorate, political struggle over the 
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political polarization and instability. The potential for vicious cycles are very 
clear. 
2. In a noncooperative political equilibrium, politicians view their horizon 
as short. They know that when they will be out of office their opponents will 
show “no mercy.” Thus, policymakers may try to redistribute resources not 
only from currently taxable resources, but they will also borrow abroad to 
distribute resources to their supporting constituencies. Future governments 
will  be left with the debt burden; in the meantime, the beneficiaries of  the 
foreign borrowing can take advantage of  it and  may  even shelter their re- 
sources from future taxation. Note that these kinds of  short-sighted partisan 
policies are not necessarily the prerogative of populist governments, but also 
of right-wing governments. During the tenure of the latter, one often observes 
at the same time public borrowing and private capital flight.’ 
3. Political polarization may lead to costly delays in adjustment to adverse 
shocks, and to repeated failed stabilization attempts.2  If, in the aftermath of 
an adverse shock, countries need to pursue costly stabilization  policies, differ- 
ent politically powerful groups may disagree on the allocation of  the burden 
of  the adjustment. In a politically polarized country, these groups may find it 
hard to agree on a mutually acceptable division of the burden. Instead, they 
may engage in political struggles to shelter themselves from all or most of the 
stabilization costs and make the other groups pay for the adjustment. Success- 
ful stabilizations are then delayed until one of the groups consolidates its po- 
litical influence and makes it impossible for its opponent to “veto” its desired 
stabilization plan. Lacking cooperation, time is needed to resolve the non- 
cooperative “war” over who should pay  for the adjustment. Needless to say, 
in most cases, the more one country waits to stabilize, the higher are the ag- 
gregate costs of  the stabilization when  it  is finally implemented. In  many 
cases, these delays take the form of monetary financing of budget deficits in a 
situation in  which a political deadlock makes it impossible to raise noninfla- 
tionary taxes or cut expenditures. 
These views are consistent with the finding of  the paper by  Kaufman and 
Stallings that the countries that experienced the largest economic difficulties 
are transitional democracies. These are in fact cases in which political uncer- 
tainty, polarization, and unresolved political struggles between groups are 
particularly important. 
I will close with a general remark concerning the usefulness of the political 
economy approach. A question is often asked in the discussion of  populist 
experiences, and more generally in the discussion of  Latin American eco- 
nomic difficulties: Why is  it that certain countries keep repeating the same 
“mistakes” and never learn? In fact, once the political and institutional incen- 
1. For a formal discussion of this case, see Alberto Alesina and Allan Drazen, “Why are stabi- 
2. This case is argued by Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini in “External debt, capital flight 
lizations delayed?” NBER Working Paper no. 3053 (Cambridge, Mass., 1989). 
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tives and constraints are correctly taken into account, policies that appear to 
be mistakes are perfectly rational responses to distorted or imperfect political 
incentives.  The political economy approach attempts to explain why certain 
apparent mistakes repeatedly  occur. This approach underscores that one can- 
not correct the “mistakes” without addressing the institutional features which 
make these so-called mistakes likely to occur. 